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Considering it has the same basic mission as the A-10...…… Why is it NOT being named as the A-10 complete replacement ?  With McCain dead. His followers will probably give up the support for the A-10.  More great Boeing on time  and no cost over run airplanes for the USA.  

Oh well

My rocking chair needs attention.

 

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31 minutes ago, cyclops2 said:

Considering it has the same basic mission as the A-10...…… Why is it NOT being named as the A-10 complete replacement ? 

Hahaha, I know, right.  When they first said it would replace the A-10 -- as far as close air support -- I think that freaked more people out than the total estimated cost of the program.  Seeing all those pics of shot up and torn up A-10s returning to base safely in Iraq and Afghanistan was like no way the F-35 would ever sustain that type of ground to air fire and abuse and have the same survivability as the A-10.  Not to mention that the reason the F-35 is so pudgy in the first place is because it's essentially a flying gas tank.  The thing carries so much fuel to enhance its range which is one of its many great assets, but that's also more likely that getting down close for troop support and taking a couple of 7.62 rounds from an AK-47 would likely light the thing up instantly.  And it's tough to imagine it performing CAS from a safe enough distance the way the A-10 gets right down there and rips tanks apart with its gattling gun.

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I have read where just the arrival of 1 or 2   A-10s on a battle stopped all combat & allowed us to safely retreat.  Brave enemy . Yes.             Suicidal to a A-10 ?  Very iffy.

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 Electric would be a huge sale point for Green People flying.

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On ‎4‎/‎1‎/‎2019 at 5:55 PM, Curt said:

Don’t also be surprised if the 200 hour total flight time minimum for the right seater in the developing part of the world is changed as well. (There’s a reason an S-suffix isn’t available.)

Have you been following the hearings and the latest on this?  A portion of advocates "blaming" training and such on the developing world while others stating the feature is not even listed in the manual.  Some really interesting and opposing POVs.

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3 hours ago, Hatem said:

Have you been following the hearings and the latest on this?  A portion of advocates "blaming" training and such on the developing world while others stating the feature is not even listed in the manual.  Some really interesting and opposing POVs.

Not really because the process has been politicized and should consequently be ignored. What matters are the NTSB and FAA (and the local equivalent where these awful tragedies occurred). I patiently await these reports, investigative materials and conclusions which won’t be tarnished or influenced for the sake of sound bites and political grandstanding. Blame gets nobody anywhere, and this is all the politicians care about. Back to the point, training is an issue, just like the system apparently not being described or briefed. But, my comment regarding 200 hours is from a different perspective. At 200 total hours of flight time, your intellectual and physical skills haven’t matured enough to be relied on. This is a very complex aircraft. When things go bad and seconds count, experience matters. Pilots don’t get paid for being able to fly in good weather or with equipment operating as intended. Pilots get paid to put it safely back on the ground when weather’s bad and in-spite of equipment failures. A 200 hour right seat minimum for any commercial aircraft, let alone the Max 8, is wholly inadequate, absurd and an accident waiting to happen even if you happen to be Orville or Wilber Wright or Chuck Yeager. There are phases of flight where the workload is great, especially in congested airspace or difficult terrain. The right seater needs to compliment the left seater, and be able to contribute to problem solving and the situation without freezing. At 200 hours, you’re frozen, thought process confused and not assimilating in real time when it’s all going wrong. This makes the left seat job very difficult when those seconds matter. Think of it this way, you captain your 287 wonderfully. Does this qualify you to co-captain a 1,000 foot freighter through the St. Lawrence Seaway in fog without functional radar or depth soundings with 200 hours total time on the water? Of course not. Those crews are not to blame. The reality is a great number of things deviated from long accepted standards and many souls were lost. 

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Drop anchor & notify River Control.  That is all you can do.

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Watch the news next week regarding this.  Can't say more, but watch Wed/Thu timeframe.  Should be entertaining.

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So, was the MCAS working properly but fed bad info from the broken AOA indicator?  

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1 hour ago, SST said:

So, was the MCAS working properly but fed bad info from the broken AOA indicator?  

That's how I understand it.  But because MCAS procedures weren't taught is why we're here.

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1 hour ago, SST said:

So, was the MCAS working properly but fed bad info from the broken AOA indicator?  

None of us have facts to state one way or the other. With what’s swirling around, one can more or less argue both sides. The puzzling thing to me remains, when confronted with or you suspect runaway trim, you're trained to look at the wheel. If it’s moving without pilot input, grab it, the other flies.

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14 hours ago, Curt said:

None of us have facts to state one way or the other. With what’s swirling around, one can more or less argue both sides. The puzzling thing to me remains, when confronted with or you suspect runaway trim, you're trained to look at the wheel. If it’s moving without pilot input, grab it, the other flies.

Wasn't the issue with the MCAS that once it takes control of the aircraft from the pilot because of this AoA sensor (regardless of whether it was faulty or broken) that even if the pilot took control of the yolk and pulled back on it, the MCAS only allowed him to do it for 5 seconds and then it would retake control and nose down again?  I think this was the problem with it and while eventually the MCAS would release complete control, but at low altitude there just isn't enough time to go through that sequence. 

And here's the other issue I see - what ever happened to redundancy?  The MCAS is fed a possible stall due to low speed high AoA from a single sensor?  Many of the pilots that are speaking out about this are saying how unheard of that is.  I guess it goes all the way back to the creation of the MAX 8 and the American Airlines contract.

They're getting ready to purchase 200 Airbus A320 with these latest and greatest RR fuel efficient engines and Boeing tries to get in on the deal and is awarded half of that order and were a bit pressured to get the aircraft out in time without delays.  So instead of building a new aircraft from start, they took the 737 and added these new engines to it to compete with the A320.  Problem is, the engine is too big to fit under the wing so they pushed it up and forward which now created this possible low AoA stall at takeoff and the rest is history. 

I just think that between all that inherent design flaw as a result of adding those new engines, the lack of redundancy with the AoA sensors and the fact that they never mentioned any of it AND there is no checklist to deal with it in the manual AND no times to trim up at takeoff because of the 5 seconds and low altitude are just too much to lay any blame on any of the pilots.  The worst part is that in order to add a second AoA sensor to create some kind of redundancy because of this design issue that would cause a single AoA sensor to trigger the MCAS and pitch nose down on takeoff like that would've either delayed certification or forced pilots to go through additional time-consuming training is crazy.  I think it was level A training that was the standard but with a second sensor it's level B training which is more time, money & delayed certification.  There just seems to be way too many compounding issues with the design and consequently the system in the aircraft.  While I do agree with your premise on the 200 hours of training, I think this is a bit beyond that TBH.  Knowing what speed to reach to rotate and pull up to a certain degree and maintain that seems pretty basic and shouldn't be anywhere near causing a sensor to detect high AoA and eminent stall.  Something is not right.

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9 hours ago, Hatem said:

Wasn't the issue with the MCAS that once it takes control of the aircraft from the pilot because of this AoA sensor (regardless of whether it was faulty or broken) that even if the pilot took control of the yolk and pulled back on it, the MCAS only allowed him to do it for 5 seconds and then it would retake control and nose down again?  I think this was the problem with it and while eventually MCAS would release complete control, at low altitude there just isn't enough time to go through that sequence. 

That’s not exactly correct. Runaway trim is dealt with just as I wrote it on this, the earlier 37’s and nearly every other a/c flying. As to the 200 hour minimum, that’s one of many core issues to be revealed and is not secondary. V1 and V2, etc. are just the tip of the iceberg and are not “just basic” skills, techniques or understandings. The key with European and North American commercial minimums are they allow you time to build skills, experience and reaction (mind and muscle memory) so when the s-hits the fan, it’s dealt with and you don’t end up at the bottom of a hole. Seconds matter. Seconds is usually all you have. Perhaps when internet “flying” knowing when to rotate is all that’s needed, but you need much more when in either seat, in real tin with souls behind you. 

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With regard to training and experience, that's been slipping for many years now.  Airlines are putting pressure on schools to churn out pilots at a high rate.  The older crowd of pilots have gone through a different style of training.  They were trained in the military or those like me were trained by former military pilots.  Today's kids are trained by other kids who just finished their own flight training.  There is no experience passed on and is completely backwards.  In what other safety-sensitive industry are new employees trained by new employees?  Anywhere else, new employees are trained by seasoned veterans.  One would think the airline-bound crews would be the same.  The public would be shocked if they really understood the process.

This is especially true in the foreign-trained population.  These kids are trained to fly the electronics and to trust them.  They lack the basic stick and rudder skills that could eventually get them out of some hairy situations.  I have personally discussed this with pilots who have gone overseas to train Asian pilots.  They go over for the big bucks, but usually find that the training they're asked to give is far below their comfort level and they can't wait to return stateside.  Their stories are harrowing and many times they say they'll never fly the airline they just trained at.  Remember Asiana at SFO??

So there is truth in the experience level.  Personally, I can fly a B737.  I've flown the simulators.  I can start it, taxi it, configure for takeoff, and perform the takeoff.  I believe I can even land it quite nicely.  All if everything worked perfectly.  Would I trust myself to fly a plane load of people?  Of course not.  Someone at 200 hours?  NEVER!

Twelve years ago I flew a Cessna 172 with a guy all over Florida.  We flew 24 legs over 10 days down the east coast of Florida, to the keys, up the west coast and into Mobile Alabama then back.  Landed at TPA, EYW, PBI, and many other smaller airports too.  This pilot had received his training at a 141 school and earned his instrument rating.  He did not know how to pick up a clearance at an uncontrolled airport, could not pick up a clearance in the air, was uncomfortable with any approach other than an ILS approach, would not accept a SID or a STAR because he didn't know how to fly them, had trouble filing a flight plan, and when we lost the vacuum pump on one leg, he thought we would also lose the altimeter and VSI (wrong).  There were MANY other deficiencies and this was a guy who had just completed that training and passed his checkride.  This "training" is happening in the US!!  

Today's training is becoming complacent because of the reliance on technology and the pressure by the airlines to pump out new pilots.  It's going to get worse before it gets better.

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3 hours ago, TexasPilot71 said:

Today's training is becoming complacent because of the reliance on technology and the pressure by the airlines to pump out new pilots.  It's going to get worse before it gets better.

Very true.

Suggest taking a look at an interesting statistic; missed approaches. Starting a few years back the incident rate jumped substantially.

This is a story with both a good and bad side though, not just bad as many would at least initially see and focus on.

First the good. Excellent crew decision making. As you know, when in doubt go around. Unless on fumes, even if you will then violate fuel minimums, you don’t have to land. Execute MA and self report the violation if there is one (though there shouldn’t be one in the first place because you should have deviated).

Second, and potentially bad... why the statistical jump? Experience? Hand skills? Other?

We’re in the middle of interesting times for Part 121. First, we’re transitioning from the last of the workhorses... the -9’s, -80’s, -88’s, -90’s, the Classics, etc. If you couldn’t hand fly, you washed out. Second, the last big wave of war gained flight experience is retiring.

The “Other” I refer to above could very well be generational. We’re in a generational transition. The gray hair is coming out of the cockpit, and the technology has and is certainly changing. More like a video game now for sure, but...

The result, and I also agree with you, hand flying has become “less” important (about 85% of the time). But, when it’s needed, it’s needed. Thus, training and experience requirements need to evolve but still keep things safe during that 15%. 200 just doesn’t work no matter how much pressure there is.

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Excellent post, @Curt.  Couldn't agree more.  Agreed, going around is a lost art.  I mean that in the vein of people are more and more concerned with a violation, fuel expense, paperwork, etc.  Gone (or at least going) are the days of the experienced, gray haired pilot telling folks over the PA "sometimes it's just not right and we err on the side of caution" (or something similar) and just dealing with the extra paperwork or fuel burn. 

Just yesterday there was a cockpit video going around the internet of a plane on short final in a severe thunderstorm.  Lightning all around.  Good visibility, but the runway lights went out for about a second and a half, then came back on low or med intensity (probably PCL).  The caption was "go around or not?".  One of the commenters said "you can always go around" and said that he would have gone around in that situation.  I always thought "you can always go around" was true until I saw this video.  Most pilots on the forum agreed...no need to go around; especially with that storm approaching.  Approach was stabilized and there was enough ambient light.  But it clearly illustrated a new generational mentality that when something fails they should abandon whatever it is that they're doing.  Us older guys say "hang on...fly the #%^$&%$ airplane".  The runway is still there, the plane is stabilized on approach, and there's a nasty storm approaching that may be a far worse hazard.

 

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UUUGGGHHH   

Are we forgetting the companies goals ?    No crew.  Just a POSSIBLE pilot in a corporate pilot house doing 6 flight chats.  When the   A I master computer goes off line for a critical update now.

Airline goal ?  Dump pilots. Never fuel.

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7 hours ago, TexasPilot71 said:

Just yesterday there was a cockpit video going around the internet of a plane on short final in a severe thunderstorm.  Lightning all around.  Good visibility, but the runway lights went out for about a second and a half, then came back on low or med intensity (probably PCL).  The caption was "go around or not?".  One of the commenters said "you can always go around" and said that he would have gone around in that situation.  I always thought "you can always go around" was true until I saw this video.  Most pilots on the forum agreed...no need to go around; especially with that storm approaching.  Approach was stabilized and there was enough ambient light.  But it clearly illustrated a new generational mentality that when something fails they should abandon whatever it is that they're doing.  Us older guys say "hang on...fly the #%^$&%$ airplane".  The runway is still there, the plane is stabilized on approach, and there's a nasty storm approaching that may be a far worse hazard.

What's one of the early lessons and a statement nearly all instructors, FSDO's, evaluators, mentors, etc. use repeatedly?  Fly the plane no matter what. 

I hate to even say this, but it's likely not a coincidence this didn't happen in North America and Europe. Same plane. Same lack of information. Same uncommunicated and undocumented configuration changes. Same disabled warning lights. Same single AOA. Same meteorological challenges. Same terrain challenges. But, hundreds if not thousands of times more segments flown in North America and Europe (put differently, many more opportunities for a like catastrophe). Difference?  On average, 5,500 ++ in the left seat and 3,500 + in the right. (Before you flame me, I'm not in any way blaming these crews. They and their airlines met applicable legal minimums where flagged. The regulatory framework in conjunction with a bunch of other stuff, including Boeing's seemingly obvious failures, failed these crews and all of the souls that were tragically lost. But, MCAS is not the single cause and time will bear out a multitude of other relevant and important factors - both major and minor. Fortunately, due to the regulatory framework accident investigations occur within and this industry's complete willingness to incorporate lessons learned, aviation has proven time and time again that nobody perishes in vain. Positive changes always result that make flying even safer tomorrow.)

As to the above example TexasPilot71; if cleared, I can see it, minimums are good, stable and I'm comfortable, I'm landing. If I'm not cleared, I can't see it, minimums are busted, too fast/going long or I'm not comfortable for any or no specific reason, I'm missed and radioing approach after the turn when stable and time allows. As you know... Permission is not needed. Published MA procedures exist for all controlled airports and runways, and they are reviewed and briefed long before gear drops on all segments. Fly the plane no matter what.  

Hatem, I love you man, but regarding the statement "...MCAS that once it takes control...", this system and any and all other systems that interface with flight controls and surfaces are designed with another failsafe many non-pilots aren't aware of, namely breakaway pressure. All of these systems, including MCAS by reports, are designed to be manually overcome with a specific amount of force. If memory serves, not in excess of 35 or 45-foot pounds depending on which control surface or component. In this case, grab that wheel to your lower right/left depending on which seat you occupy, and further movement is arrested regardless if there are 1 or 1,000 AOA's reading erroneously, regardless if you or the copilot keeps hitting the thumb control, regardless if the system wasn't disabled with the two toggles just fore of the throttles. The key though, and this is where and why experience matters, you have to assimilate and identify the issue timely because MCAS, as designed and deployed, treated each commanded input as a single event with the cumulative maximum being 100% of the horizontal stabilizer's range. Once the jack screw bottoms, it's going to be difficult if not impossible while at low altitude to back it off enough to pitch back to level and then upward.

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23 hours ago, Curt said:

That’s not exactly correct. Runaway trim is dealt with just as I wrote it on this, the earlier 37’s and nearly every other a/c flying.

What's not correct?  The 5 seconds interval that the MCAS allows for manual control?  Sorry if I missed it when you wrote about it, just refer me to it again or please explain and I hope you will add info from sources to support what you say and not the typical Chaparral forum crap of "believe me because I say so and you know nothing unless you've flown 10 airplanes in your lifetime or taken 10 engines out of a boat so you shouldn't speak" crap.  :haha-7383: Or "it's clear you don't understand blah blah blah. :) 

I know you're not like that, I'm just throwing it out there just in case someone gets that stupid idea.

I read it somewhere, either Aviation Weekly or even in Combat Aircraft Magazine both had a very detailed article with the same explanation of the 5 seconds the MCAS allows the pilot to control the AC during this pivotal computer take-over and then it goes right back into MCAS' control.   I wish I could pull it up.  But even here on 60 minutes it says the same thing:

From minute 21:15 - 24:00 and this is coming straight from the horse's mouth, a current US Max-8 pilot and a British one flying the same aircraft. 

So what is it exactly?  Is it simply that they only have this 5 seconds to do what they need to do going through the checklist etc. OR, are you saying they should be able to completely turn off the automated control and take over manually?  It doesn't sound like you're able to shut down the MCAS completely and take over manually. 

Here's the other thing - this is not happening at a slow speed, but rather while the aircraft is cruising pretty fast because it's taking off.  So not only does it sound like this sensor is faulty when it triggers a SLOW, imminent high AoA stall while the aircraft is moving rather pretty darn fast, but now it's nose-diving at an even greater air speed!  I'm sorry, but that is CRAAAAAAZY!  Pilots should never have to deal with anything like that.  Oh and that was the reason I posted that other video of the MAX 8 doing that near-vertical takeoff because there was an example of a very steep AoA yet the sensor wasn't triggered because there was plenty of airspeed. 

Or were the Malaysian and Ethiopian pilots taking off at too low of an airspeed?  Since the sensor was added because of the engine placement on the wing and it's higher, airflow is altered and maybe because of that, it has a propensity to get less airflow through the fans and senses a stall?  Either way, that's a design flaw. 

23 hours ago, Curt said:

As to the 200 hour minimum, that’s one of many core issues to be revealed and is not secondary. V1 and V2, etc. are just the tip of the iceberg and are not “just basic” skills, techniques or understandings. The key with European and North American commercial minimums are they allow you time to build skills, experience and reaction (mind and muscle memory) so when the s-hits the fan, it’s dealt with and you don’t end up at the bottom of a hole. Seconds matter. Seconds is usually all you have.

Can't say I don't agree with all of that.  But here's another possibility that no one seems to be taking into consideration - just because these two crashes happened in Malaysia and Ethiopia, doesn't mean the system is not faulty.  If you watch that entire 60 minutes video, there were over 200 reported incidents of this malfunction around the world.  So this has happened quite often without a catastrophic end to them and I doubt all these instances were only in Europe or North America, but rather all around the world.

23 hours ago, Curt said:

Perhaps when internet “flying” knowing when to rotate is all that’s needed, but you need much more when in either seat, in real tin with souls behind you. 

You misunderstood.  I wasn't talking about internet flying come owwwwn, maaaaan!  :haha-7383:  This is what I said:

23 hours ago, Hatem said:

  While I do agree with your premise on the 200 hours of training, I think this is a bit beyond that TBH.  Knowing what speed to reach to rotate and pull up to a certain degree and maintain that seems pretty basic and shouldn't be anywhere near causing a sensor to detect high AoA and eminent stall.  Something is not right.

I'm talking about these pilots all over the world during takeoff (since this is the time when this slow speed high AoA sensor seems to be activating) and taking off is probably the most basic learning experience taught and it's by the book every time.  Plane is at the end of the runway, (flaps are full down and all that happy @#$%@#) pilot throttles up and plane moves along and co-pilot calls out speed intervals in knots until they reach whatever rotating speed is (100km/hr?)  Whatever it is and then pilot rotates to a designated degree and elevators trim up and nose goes up and bird takes off and that appropriate angle and airspeed is maintained until the aircraft reaches a certain altitude and pilot either begins a turn or levels off etc.  The sequence is pretty standard and all the numbers are followed to a T.  Airspeed, AoA, etc.  Why would that sensor ever detect slow speed and then see a nose-up attitude (oh it's taking off, weird lol) and trigger the MCAS to take over?  Taking off is about as standard as it can be and that's what I'm saying (not internet or simulation flying) and so why is this sensor going off?  This is where the pilots and all the baggage associated should be separated from the technology function or malfunction. 

EDIT:  Of course all the preliminary pre-flight and take-off checklist is all reviewed and followed thoroughly, especially take-off weight, which I'm sure is all done accordingly by all pilots prior to even taxiing out of terminal. 

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I will try to remember the reason stated.  The plane has 2 sensors. A MASTER & a confirming sensor. It was found that the 2 sensors connections were ....SWAPPED..... So The master channel was receiving signals from the damaged sensor.  The system reacted as if the MASTER sensor was connected. It was not.    So the plane had 2 strikes against it.  Add in low altitude ?

 

BIG  BIG edit............ They also stated because the MASTER GOOD SENSOR was connected to the lower priority CONFIRMING CHANNEL.  The TRUE GOOD READINGS FROM THE MASTER SENSOR WERE NOT ACCEPTED. 

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3 hours ago, cyclops2 said:

I will try to remember the reason stated.  The plane has 2 sensors. A MASTER & a confirming sensor. It was found that the 2 sensors connections were ....SWAPPED..... So The master channel was receiving signals from the damaged sensor.  The system reacted as if the MASTER sensor was connected. It was not.    So the plane had 2 strikes against it.  Add in low altitude ?

 

BIG  BIG edit............ They also stated because the MASTER GOOD SENSOR was connected to the lower priority CONFIRMING CHANNEL.  The TRUE GOOD READINGS FROM THE MASTER SENSOR WERE NOT ACCEPTED. 

Almost correct. 2 sensors, only 1 feed to MCAS. 

The point I think you are trying to make is prior to these 2 models, standard practice for accuracy and redundancy was 2. Actually, in many a/c 3 or more. They have to agree within certain defined parameters or the automated commands are ignored.

The other point I think you mean to make is why 1. At least 2 has been standard practice for decades. Why...

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On 5/17/2019 at 7:31 AM, Hatem said:

What's not correct?  The 5 seconds interval that the MCAS allows for manual control?  Sorry if I missed it when you wrote about it, just refer me to it again or please explain and I hope you will add info from sources to support what you say and not the typical Chaparral forum crap of "believe me because I say so and you know nothing unless you've flown 10 airplanes in your lifetime or taken 10 engines out of a boat so you shouldn't speak" crap.  :haha-7383: Or "it's clear you don't understand blah blah blah. :) 

I know you're not like that, I'm just throwing it out there just in case someone gets that stupid idea.

I read it somewhere, either Aviation Weekly or even in Combat Aircraft Magazine both had a very detailed article with the same explanation of the 5 seconds the MCAS allows the pilot to control the AC during this pivotal computer take-over and then it goes right back into MCAS' control.   I wish I could pull it up.  But even here on 60 minutes it says the same thing:

From minute 21:15 - 24:00 and this is coming straight from the horse's mouth, a current US Max-8 pilot and a British one flying the same aircraft. 

So what is it exactly?  Is it simply that they only have this 5 seconds to do what they need to do going through the checklist etc. OR, are you saying they should be able to completely turn off the automated control and take over manually?  It doesn't sound like you're able to shut down the MCAS completely and take over manually. 

Here's the other thing - this is not happening at a slow speed, but rather while the aircraft is cruising pretty fast because it's taking off.  So not only does it sound like this sensor is faulty when it triggers a SLOW, imminent high AoA stall while the aircraft is moving rather pretty darn fast, but now it's nose-diving at an even greater air speed!  I'm sorry, but that is CRAAAAAAZY!  Pilots should never have to deal with anything like that.  Oh and that was the reason I posted that other video of the MAX 8 doing that near-vertical takeoff because there was an example of a very steep AoA yet the sensor wasn't triggered because there was plenty of airspeed. 

Or were the Malaysian and Ethiopian pilots taking off at too low of an airspeed?  Since the sensor was added because of the engine placement on the wing and it's higher, airflow is altered and maybe because of that, it has a propensity to get less airflow through the fans and senses a stall?  Either way, that's a design flaw. 

Can't say I don't agree with all of that.  But here's another possibility that no one seems to be taking into consideration - just because these two crashes happened in Malaysia and Ethiopia, doesn't mean the system is not faulty.  If you watch that entire 60 minutes video, there were over 200 reported incidents of this malfunction around the world.  So this has happened quite often without a catastrophic end to them and I doubt all these instances were only in Europe or North America, but rather all around the world.

You misunderstood.  I wasn't talking about internet flying come owwwwn, maaaaan!  :haha-7383:  This is what I said:

I'm talking about these pilots all over the world during takeoff (since this is the time when this slow speed high AoA sensor seems to be activating) and taking off is probably the most basic learning experience taught and it's by the book every time.  Plane is at the end of the runway, (flaps are full down and all that happy @#$%@#) pilot throttles up and plane moves along and co-pilot calls out speed intervals in knots until they reach whatever rotating speed is (100km/hr?)  Whatever it is and then pilot rotates to a designated degree and elevators trim up and nose goes up and bird takes off and that appropriate angle and airspeed is maintained until the aircraft reaches a certain altitude and pilot either begins a turn or levels off etc.  The sequence is pretty standard and all the numbers are followed to a T.  Airspeed, AoA, etc.  Why would that sensor ever detect slow speed and then see a nose-up attitude (oh it's taking off, weird lol) and trigger the MCAS to take over?  Taking off is about as standard as it can be and that's what I'm saying (not internet or simulation flying) and so why is this sensor going off?  This is where the pilots and all the baggage associated should be separated from the technology function or malfunction. 

EDIT:  Of course all the preliminary pre-flight and take-off checklist is all reviewed and followed thoroughly, especially take-off weight, which I'm sure is all done accordingly by all pilots prior to even taxiing out of terminal. 

I’m not saying the “system” isn't faulty; I am saying MCAS is not the sole issue. Crashes are seldom the result of a single issue, and that is abundantly clear in both tragedies at issue here.

As to all of that other stuff, again, that’s not how it works. I now realize I’m unable to explain this in a way that’s understandable because post after post you keep bouncing back to things that are inaccurate, not correct, etc. So, two options to break the stalemate and develop knowledge. Get a buddy to take you up so you can see how it’s actually done and what’s meant by all of the explanations, or I will. TexasPilot71 is welcome to join in for the cross country run as well - he gets it - and there’s nothing better than the 40’s on a clear crisp evening or early morning. In your neck of the woods, daytime and evening is real congested and ATC generally not amenable to “sightseeing”. So, we’d run to the north, northwest. The kerosene is on me. Remember, I lost my medical and can’t be in either seat unless the a/c is single pilot rated and the left seater is S-endorsed on that type. 

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Interesting article about MCAS.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html?utm_source=pocket-newtab

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